The Home Front in World War II November 15, 2018

Copyright © 2018                               John F. Oyler 

November 15, 2018

The Home Front in World War II

The Bridgeville Area Historical Society welcomed back one of its favorite speakers, Todd DePastino, for its October program meeting. Known primarily as the Director of the popular non-profit Veterans Breakfast Club, an activity focused on helping veterans “ensure that this living history will never be forgotten”, Dr. DePastino is a historian and writer specializing in the United States in mid-twentieth century.

His specific topic for this presentation was the Home Front in World War II. He began by quoting President Roosevelt in a statement that the war would not be won because of the valor of our troop nor the superiority of our equipment, but by the fact that we could out-produce the rest of the world in munitions. Quantity would prevail over quality.

I presumed we were about to hear about the monumental manufacturing accomplishments that did occur on the Home Front – mass production of airplanes, tanks, and ships – with special attention to the role played by inexperienced female workers (Rosie the Riveter). Instead he shifted abruptly to a completely different subject, the social-economic effects of taxation, investment in war bonds, price control, and rationing.

These were equally relevant topics; nonetheless I wished we could have discussed the contribution of our local industries to the war effort. We know that Flannery Bolt won an Army-Navy “E” award for its production of machine gun barrels; perhaps this is a valid subject for one of our future “Second Tuesday” workshops.

The speaker’s review of taxation was quite revealing. He showed an exhibit of federal spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In World War II it peaked at forty seven percent (Today it is at twenty five percent). To achieve this, the personal income tax rate was dramatically increased. Prior to the war only eight percent of the fifty million wage earners paid any income tax.

At the peak of the war the minimum tax rate was twenty three percent (for people earning five hundred dollars a year); the maximum rate for folks earning more than $200,000 per year was ninety four percent. Even that was not sufficient for the President. He unsuccessfully attempted to impose a rate of one hundred percent on all annual income above twenty-five thousand dollars. 

A parallel effort to help finance the war effort was the introduction of war bonds. According to Dr. DePastino, this was done primarily to deter inflation. In the first World War the consumer price index went up about thirty percent in two years, as a consequence of the shortage of consumer goods. This time the federal economists sought to prevent a repetition by encouraging consumers to invest their discretionary income in War Bonds.

Although the President wanted this to be a compulsory requirement, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau persuaded him that a voluntary program would appeal to the ordinary citizen’s sense of patriotism and allow him or her to be part of the War Effort. The result was an outpouring of one hundred and eighty-six billion dollars, enough to pay for more than half of the war’s expenses.

The most popular bond was the twenty–five-dollar version. A patriot would invest $18.75 at a return of 2.9% interest. Ten years later the bond could be redeemed for $25.00. Frequently the cost of the bond would be covered by the purchase of savings stamps, typically twenty-five cents apiece, that would be accumulated in a book until the required total was reached.

Consumer price control was another government experiment in managing the economy. At its peak, the Office of Price Administration was able to freeze prices on ninety percent of the consumer goods. Despite an aggressive propaganda effort to popularize this effort, it was greatly resented by the public. Unscrupulous retailers often coupled sales of controlled items with items that were not controlled but offered at exorbitant prices.

Rationing was the final tool in the managed economy; it too was unpopular. The first item to be rationed was sugar, an item that was indeed in very short supply. It was hoped that this move would ensure that every consumer got a fair, albeit reduced, share in the commodity. Initially sugar was rationed to one half pound per week per person. Coupon books were provided to each household; the coupons eventually were collected and redeemed by the local ration boards.

Next came coffee, quickly followed by shoes (one pair per person every six months). Gasoline was especially restricted. Most drivers received “A” cards, that allowed them three or four gallons of gas per week. Exceptions were made for war workers, who needed a car to get to work, and for other “essential” drivers. 

Apparently gasoline rationing was primarily aimed at reducing replacement of automobile and truck tires. The Japanese early success in the war had cut us off from our traditional supply of rubber; synthetic rubber was just beginning to be developed. Families were limited to five tires, regardless of the number of vehicles they owned.

Eventually each family had two ration books. “Red” coupons covered all meat, butter, fat, oils, and most cheeses. “Blue” coupons covered soup, baby food, ketchup, canned goods, juices, and dry beans. Each item had a specific point value which changed frequently. To make change, a set of red and blue fiber board dime-sized coins was made available to the retailers.

The logistics of such a system is difficult to imagine. Small wonder the federal government grew so rapidly in those days. It is not surprising that the entire program led to a massive black market, with unscrupulous suppliers taking advantage of consumers with surplus money.

Dr. DePastino is a dynamic speaker, particularly dealing with subjects from the era in which he specializes; it is always a treat to attend one of his presentations. We were a little disappointed nonetheless that this specific talk was so general. It is hard to imagine discussing this subject in Bridgeville without mentioning Eddie Croft and the Junior Commandos, for example. My earlier suggestion of a future workshop on this subject as it applies to Bridgeville looks even more promising.

The next program will be presented at 7:30 pm on November 27, 2018 in the Chartiers Room of the Bridgeville Volunteer Fire Department. Mr. Brian Charlton, Curator-Archivist of the Donora Historical Society, will discuss “The 1948 Smog Tragedy, Donora, Pa.”